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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This suit involves the interpretation of the provision 
of a lease dealing with renewal. The essential dispute is 
whether or not Paragraph VII of the lease grants Appellants 
an option for a new ten-year term after the expiration of 
the original term of the lease or merely grants Appellants 
a right of first refusal. Also at issue is the Trial Court's 
basis for determining the reasonable rental value of the 
property, and thus the amount due to the landlord for the 
period during which the Appellants held over after the expir-
ation of the lease. Finally, Appellants are contesting their 
personal liability for the amount of the judgment. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court, the Honorable Ernest 
F. Baldwin, Jr., presiding. Upon completion of the presenta-
tion of evidence and argument by both parties, memoranda were 
submitted and judgment was rendered for Respondents and against 
Bowens, Inc., and Charles and Shirley Bowen, as individuals, 
in the amount of $35,000.00. This amount was based upon the 
reasonable rental value of the premises for a period of ten 
months during which Appellants held over after the expiration 
of the lease on August 31, 1976. After reviewing the dis-
puted testimony of the expert witnesses, the rate of $3,500.00 
per month was set by the Court, the figure being somewhere 
between the disparate figures in evidence. 
-1-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellants contend that the lease should be con-
strued to grant Bowens, Inc. the right to a new ten-year 
term at the expiration of the original lease. Secondly, 
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment against Charles and 
Shirley Bowen as individuals. Respondents submit that the 
Trial Court correctly decided the issues in this case and 
that, therefore, the judgment of restitution of the premises 
and rental payment for the period of hold-over should be 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts contained in the Brief of 
Appellants is only partially correct and includes irrelevant 
matters as well as allegations and conclusions which are not 
supported by the record. Appellants have not complied with 
the Appellate Rules of this Court which require a fair and 
correct recital of the facts. Therefore, Respondents find 
it necessary to set forth a sununary of the basic facts 
which are supported by the record. 
The Kearns Bowling Lanes are part of a complex includ-
ing a cafe, a lounge, a game room and a bowling alley which 
are located in the same building. The facility was constructei 
approximately twenty years ago on real property located at 
3951 West 5400 South in Salt Lake County, Utah. On August 31, 
1966, Diamond Developments, Inc., the original purchaser of 
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the property, leased the facility to Howard C. Nelson and 
W. Roy Brown. Diamond Developments, Inc. subsequently sold 
the property to Manivest Corporation who assumed the role of 
landlord. The August 31, 1966 Lease Agreement (Ex. 32-D 
which is also part of Ex. 1), which the Court is called upon 
to construe in this action, covers the bowling alley portion 
of the building, together with the lanes, pinsetters, tel-e-
scores, spectator seats and bowlers seats installed therein. 
(R.72) Thus, the lease at issue pertains only to the bowling 
alley portion of the building and the references in Appellants' 
brief to the cafe and lounge are irrelevant to this suit. 
They are not covered by the lease in question. (Ex. 32-D and 
Tr. 121-122) 
The Lease Agreement provides for a term of ten years 
with rent payable at the rate of $1,700.00 per month during 
the heavy bowling season (September through April) and 
$725.00 per month for the remainder of the year. Among 
other provisions, the Lease Agreement contains a paragraph 
dealing with renewal which grants "to the Lessees the first 
right of refusal to renew this lease." It is the contention 
of Appellants that this paragraph grants them an option to 
renew for a new ten year term. 
In August of 1973, Bowens, Inc. entered into an Agree-
ment (Ex. 1-P) with Howard C. Nelson and W. Roy Brown which 
provided for the purchase of the bowling alley business and 
for the performance by the buyers of the obligations of the 
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former tenants under the August 31, 1966 Lease Agreement. 
Charles E. Bowen and Shirley M. Bowen, personally and 
individually, guaranteed all of the terms and conditions of 
the Purchase Agreement including the obligations of the 
tenants under the original lease by signing the document "as 
guarantors." (R.73 and Tr. 111) Shirley Bowen testified 
that under this document "we bought the bowling alley business 
and the remainder of their lease. (Tr. 111) On 
August 28, 1975, a further Agreement (Ex. 2-P) was entered 
into between Nelson and Brown and Bowens, Inc. which provided 
for the assignment of all of the rights and obligations of 
Nelson and Brown under the Lease Agreement to Bowens, Inc. 
(R. 73) Thus, the Bowens' Purchase Agreement (Ex. 1-P) 
embraced "the sale of the business including an assignment 
of the lease." (Tr. 113-:114) 
The members of the Valley Lanes group first entered 
the picture in the Spring of 1976, when Glade Syme, his 
wife and his two sons began discussing the possible purchase 
of the bowling business from the Bowens. The contemplated 
purchase was contingent upon two conditions precedent. 
First, that the Symes could obtain a loan to make the down 
payment and, second, that Manivest would agree to renew and 
extend the lease for an additional ten year term at an 
acceptable rate. The negotiations broke down when Manivest 
made it clear that it was not interested in releasing the 
bowling alley for another term, but rather wanted to sell 
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the property. (Tr. 181-182) When the Symes were unable to 
work out the terms of an extended lease they declined to 
execute the written agreement which had been prepared, 
stopped the loan application from being processed any further 
and left the premises which they had been operating for 
about six weeks on a trial basis while the details relating 
to their proposed purchase from the Bowens were being worked 
out. 
At this point, Glade and Jeff Syme talked with two 
other persons about joining together to purchase the land-
lord's interest in the premises, since, in declining to work 
out a renewed lease with the Symes, Manivest had indicated it 
wanted to sell its interest. Charles Bowen admitted in testi-
mony that he was present and participated in negotiations with 
Manivest and that he even went so far as to offer additional 
collateral of his own to induce Manivest to extend the lease 
and that in declining to do so they made it clear that "they 
would prefer to sell it." (Tr. 209) As a consequence, in 
April of 1976, Glade Syme, Ruben Gallegos, Jeffrey Syme and 
Duane Catten entered into an agreement for the purchase of 
the real property in which the bowling alley is located and, 
in connection with that purchase, the interest of the landlord 
under the August 31, 1966 Lease Agreement was assigned to them 
from Manivest. Shortly thereafter, the four individuals 
assigned their interest in the premises to Valley Lanes Corpora-
tion, which they had formed. (R. 73) 
On April 22, 1976, Irene Warr, as counsel for the Bowens, 
wrote a letter to Manivest Corporacion advising the landlord 
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of their "desire to exercise their first right of refusal to 
renew the lease on the bowling alley." (Ex. 3-P) The letter 
was forwarded to Valley Lanes and its counsel, Tom Metos, 
responded with a letter (Ex. 4-P) dated May 12, 1976, advising 
Ms. Warr of the purchase of the landlord's interest by Valley 
Lanes and that in view of "the change of economic conditions 
since the date of the original lease" the rent payable during 
any renewal period would have to be increased to $6,500.00 
per month. Contrary to Appellants' representation that these 
"terms were non-negotiable" (Brief of Appellants at 2) Para-
graph VII of the Lease Agreement provides for the resolution 
of any dispute over the fair market lease value through the 
hiring of appraisers by the two parties. Additionally, 
Respondents established at trial that these terms were nego-
tiated with, and acceptable to, a third party (Tr. 166-167) 
who was interested in leasing the premises. (Ex. 7-P) The 
Bowens frankly admitted at the time of the trial that at no 
time prior to the expiration of the lease did they hire an 
appraiser as was required by Paragraph VII. (R. 74 and Tr. 1421 
They also failed to prove that they at any time even made a 
counteroffer to the proposal by the landlord as was required 
by the Lease Agreement. (R.74) The statement that they 
"communicated an offer to pay $2,500.00 as a monthly rental" 
(Brief of Appellants at 3) is based upon Exhibit 6-P which 
the Court found to be lacking in foundation. (Tr. 122-124) 
Torn Metos, the attorney to whom the letter is addressed, 
testified that he had neither seen the letter nor discussed 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
its contents with Appellants (Tr. 160-161) and Mr. Gallegos 
testified that he had never seen the letter until it was 
shown to him in court. (Tr. 257) Consequently, the Trial 
Court found that Appellants "failed to make any kind of a 
tender of performance which would satisfy this condition of 
the Lease Agreement." (R. 74) 
After Appellants failed to accept the proposed new lease 
or to hire appraisers, the proffered new lease was withdrawn. 
Having concluded that Paragraph VII constituted a "first 
right of refusal", as it is characterized in the Lease Agree-
ment, and that the landlord was in a position to withdraw the 
property from being re-leased, Mr. Metos wrote a letter on 
July 1, 1976, doing just that. (Ex. 8-P and 9-P) In that 
same letter, the new owners offered $35,000.00 to purchase the 
pe~sonal property and fixtures which were not included under 
the terms of the original lease. After the expiration of 
the lease on August 31, 1976, the landlord served a "Notice 
to Quit" (R. 13) on the tenants and the pending cases were 
filed shortly thereafter. After consolidation the Court 
ordered that the Bowens could continue to occupy the disputed 
property during the pendancy of the proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PARAGRAPH VII OF THE AUGUST 31, 1966 LEASE AGREE-
MENT GRANTS THE LESSEE A FIRST RIGHT OF REFUSAL 
RATHER THAN AN OPTION TO RENEW AND THE BOWENS ARE 
NOT ENTITLED TO A LEASE FOR AN ADDITIONAL TEN 
YEAR TERM. 
-7-
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The fundamental issue determined by the Trial Court was 
whether the Bowens were entitled to renew the lease on the 
bowling alley for an additional ten year period. The inter-
pretation of the language of Paragraph VII of the Lease Agree-
ment was critical in resolving this issue. That paragraph 
provides: 
Lessors hereby give and grant to the Lessees 
the first right of refusal to renew this 
le-as? -- Lessee;-shali notlfy the Lessors in 
writ'ing by registered mail at least ninety 
(90) days prior to expiration of this lease 
of lessees intention to release said premises 
herein contained, otherwise Lessors shall 
assume that the Lessees does (sic) not desire 
to release and this lease shall terminate 
on August 31, 1976. Should Lessees desire 
to release, Lessors SDall submit to Lessees 
a proposed .new lease foi-aten--fl_QL~~ar -
-~rm Or abonifide~sic:J offert<:i_le~se_):>y __ 
i a Eni~=Party wi-£!1~in _ _Qli~_t:y-:u:o:) days of 
'?at~_Q_e.q~est_f()r rel_ea_~~_been n~-
9eived by Lessor~ ShOUld the Lessee feel 
the--leaseterms-unreasonable then Lessee will 
hife ~- compe~ent ap12r<J._~ser to 'prace§ f_ai-r.=_~ __ 
-lflarket l_~se __ yal~e.__ on saiQ--r5roperty. Should 
Les~r --th~n~el_this---maffet-varu-e---rtoi__rea~; 
-~ble--;-They wi],l ob_tai:~~...ap-££aj,~_~r 
t'Q--p±a-ee a fair mark,eJ;__ vaJ_ue__on ~~d property 
arn}--equipmen-t. Should --th_~_aE£_raiscers- -a.-na 
L'es'See --and Lessor 'rali-to arrive S!tame-et1ng 
~:ftfie minds;-- thenffie-twoappraisei:-swrrT--
4ppOI:nt- a thira appraTs_5!--E~-l_l\utll_~-1__~2_r-~~~ t, 
toacta:s-- a -rer-ereeand al~'3:£_ti~s concernea 
will -be--noU.Dd---oy-a-e-Tlrlding of apprars-er-s--as to 
· f'at-r-lllci~-va:rue-;------c-£x.-rr-=-1s-)-----:--- - ---
- - . --/\ __ (J 
--------------------------- ~~) /,_/ ( \ ,--/) ... l-._~"-d:-~'-2 . 
While there is a traditional 'rule that in coristrufng 
0 
ambiguous provisions relating to renewal the tenant is usually 
favored, (50 Arn. Jur. 2d, "Landlord and Tenant", §1162), 
there is no basis for doing so where, as here, neither party 
to the dispute prepared the lease and there was no evidence 
presented with respect to what was intended by the language 
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
which was employed. Russell v. Valentine, 14 Utah 2d 26, 376 
P. 2d 548 (1962). 
Thus, the place to begin is with the language contained 
in Paragraph VII of the Lease Agreement. The Agreement charac-
terizes the Lessee's right as a "first right of refusal" and, 
in interpreting the provision, this characterization cannot be 
ignored. In Basler v. Warren, 159 F.2d 41 (1947), the Tenth 
Circuit, applying Utah law to the construction of a contract, 
asserted as a universal canon of construction that every word 
and phrase in a contract should be given a meaning according 
to its importance in the context of the contract, and stated: 
Courts are not warranted in reading out of a 
contract words or phrases placed there by 
the contracting party unless they cannot be 
rationally fitted into the scheme of agree-
ment between the parties. 
See also Vulcan Steel Corporation v. Markosian, 23 Utah 2d 287, 
462 P.2d 166 (1969); Seal v. Tayco, 16 Utah 2d 323, 400 P.2d 
503 (1965); Cornwall v. Willow Creek Country Club, 13 Utah 2d 
160, 369 P.2d 928 (1962). In this connection, it is signifi-
cant that the characterization appears at the beginning of the 
paragraph and that there is no reference to an option anywhere 
in the document. 
In the case of Russell v. Park City Corporation, 548 P.2d 
889 (Utah, 1976), the Court distinguised between an option and 
a "right of refusal" as follows: 
We note awareness that what is often called 
"the right of refusal" is not the same as an 
option, wherein the optionee has a definite 
right to purchase, whereas, the right of 
refusal has no effect until and unless the 
party granting it . . decides to sell. 
-9-
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See also Chournos v. Evana Investment Co., 97 Utah 335, 93 
P.2d 450 (1939); 51C C.J.S., "Landlord and Tenant", §88(3). 
When the Valley Lanes group failed to receive either a 
counteroffer to their proposal to re~ ease the premises for 
$6,500.00 per month (R.74) or an indication that an appraiser 
had been or would be appointed, (R.74 and Tr. 142) the deci-
sion was made by them to withdraw the property from being re-
leased. The letter written by Mr. Metos on July 1, 1976 for~ 
ally conununicated the intention of the landlord to withdraw 
the premises. (Ex. 9-P) 
The "first right of refusal" gave the Bowens a preferen-
tial right in the event that the landlord elected to re~ ~ase 
the property. However, the "first right of refusal" did not 
give them the power to compel the landlord to re~ ease when 
it decided to occupy the premises itself. The July 1, 1976 
letter withdrew the property, and the preemptive right of 
the Bowens to an extended term thereby terminated. 
Even if the Court construes Paragraph VII to grant 
lessees an "option" to renew, the conclusion is inescapable 
that the Bowens did not comply therewith and that they are 
not in a position to ask that it be specifically performed. 
It is fundamental that, in order for an optionee to be entitl~ 
to specific performance, he must establish that he " ... exer· 
cised the option in accordance with its terms." Lincoln Land 
& Development Co. v. Thompson, 26 Utah 2d 324, 489 P.2d 426 
(1971). See also I.X.L. Furniture v. Berets, 32 Utah 454, 
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91 P. 279 (1907); Tilton v. Sterling Coal & Coke Co., 28 Utah 
173, 77 P. 758 (1904). The person seeking to enforce an 
option has the burden of proving that he fully performed or 
tendered full performance within the applicable time period. 
In other words: 
The mode of exercising the option, if 
specified in the contract of the parties, must 
be in accordance with that prescribed by the 
agreement, and the tenant cannot without the 
consent of the landlord abrogate or change the 
agreement. 
51C C.J.S., "Landlord and Tenant", §57. 
Paragraph VII of the Lease Agreement in question con-
tains a series of steps to be taken by the parties: 
1. Lessees give notice at least 90 days prior to the 
expiration of the lease of their intention to re-
lease the property. 
2. If the lessees give such notice, the lessors 
shall submit, within thirty days: 
(a) terms of a proposed new lease for a ten-
year term, or 
(b) a bona fide offer to lease by a third party. 
3. If the lessees feel that the new lease terms are 
unreasonable, they must hire an appraiser to place 
a ''fair market lease value" on the property. 
4. If the lessors disagree with the reasonableness 
of the amount that the lessees' appraiser arrives 
at, they can obtain their own appraisal. 
5. If the parties and their appraisers can't agree, 
then a third appraiser will be appointed to act as 
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a referee. 
6. The parties agree to be bound by the findings of 
the appraisers as to the fair market lease value. 
There is no question from the evidence that steps one and two 
were properly taken and it was up to the Bowens to take the 
next step. They had an obligation, within the period of the 
original lease, to come back with a formal offer to enter 
into a new lease based upon an appraisal. 1 This they indis-
putably failed to do. (R.74 and Tr. 142) Nor did they 
tender performance of this condition pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, §78-27-1 (1953). 
Under these circumstances the following rule is clearly 
applicable: 
The failure or inability or refusal to carry 
out the terms of the contract at the time 
when performance is due will ordinarily be 
grounds for refusing specific performance, 
since specific performance will not generally 
be decreed in favor of a party who has him-
self been in default. 
71 Am. Jur. 2d, "Specific Performance", §60. In view of the 
foregoing, the Trial Court's restitution of the premises to 
the landlord should be upheld. 
1. Respondents do not contest the major thrust of Point III 
in Appellants' Brief. That is, the appointment of app~!~ 
as provided by Paragraph VII of the lease was intended ~ 
resolve a grievance presently in existence and therefore 
does not run afoul of Barnhart v. Civil Service Employ~ 
Co., 16 Utah 2d 223, 398 P. 2d 873 (1965). Respondents de 
maintain that the failure to hire an appraiser, as re-
quired by the Lease Agreement, is grounds for denial of_ 
specific performance. See 50 Am. Jur. 2d, "Landlord ar.~ 
Tenant", §1167. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED MONTHLY RENTAL 
FOR THE PERIOD DURING WHICH THE TENANT HELD OVER 
AND THE INDEPENDENT FEE APPRAISER WHO TESTIFIED 
ON BEHALF OF VALLEY LANES HAD SUPERIOR QUALIFI-
CATIONS AND HIS APPROACH IN DETERMINING THE FAIR 
MARKET LEASE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY WAS MORE 
REALISTIC AND COMPREHENSIVE. 
Appellants do not dispute the right on the part of the 
landlord to recover a reasonable rental based on the Bowens' 
use and occupancy of the premises for a ten month period begin-
ning on September 1, 1976 and continuing through the course 
of the trial. As Appellants held over pursuant to a court 
order, treble damages under Utah Code Annotated, §78-36-10 
(1953) were held by the Trial Court to be inappropriate. The 
remaining options are either to base such an award upon the 
rental provided for under the Lease Agreement or the rental 
figures supplied by one or the other of the appraisers who 
testified at the trial. 
While there is some latitude in determining what is a 
reasonable award for hold-overs, (see, e.g., 49 Am. Jur. 2d 
"Landlord and Tenant", §1124-1129) this Court has held that 
when the tenant refused to vacate: 
The court properly awarded plaintiffs posses-
sion of the property, and damages for the 
time defendant remained in possession. Damages 
recoverable under such circumstances are gener-
ally the reasonable rental value of the premises. 
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Pingree v. Continental Group Of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317 
(Utah, 1976); Woodland Theatres, Inc. v. ABC Intermountain 
Theatres, 560 P.2d 700 (Utah, 1977). In considering the quos-
tion of damages more particularly this Court has held: 
The plaintiff is entitled to recover such dam-
ages as are the natural and proximate conse-
quences of the unlawful detainer. Clearly the 
loss of the value of the use and occupation of 
the premises, or the rental value thereof, during 
the period when the premises were unlawfully 
withheld from plaintiff, is . damage suf-
fered. While damages may not be restricted 
to the rental value and may include more, yet 
the rental value during the unlawful withhold-
ing of possession is the minimum of damages. 
Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 P. 206 (1930) (emphasis 
added). It is clear from this case that at a bare minimum 
Respondents are entitled to the amount of rent provided under 
the Lease Agreement. To be specific, Respondents are entitled 
to at least $1,700.00 per month for eight months (September 
through April) and $725.00 for two months (May and June) or a 
total of $15,050.00. It is obvious that this sum represents 
a minimum and is well below what would be a "reasonable rental 
value." If for no other reason than it represents the 
rental reserved over a decade ago, the Court should base the 
award upon the expert testimony of the appraisers. 
After reviewing the disputed testimony of the experts, 
the Trial Court awarded Respondents $3,500.00 per month for 
the period during which the Bowens held over. The basis for 
determining this figure was the expert testimony of appraisers 
for each party. Mr. John C. Brown, the independent fee appr:::c 
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who testified on behalf of Valley Lanes, found the fair 
market value of the premises to be $3,800.00 per month in 
its condition at the time of trial. (Tr. 272) He placed an 
alternative value of $5,700.00 per month on the property if 
new pin-setters were installed and a few other basic repairs 
were made. (Tr. 272) As the Bowens were perfectly aware of 
the critical need for new pin-setters and had, in fact, nego-
tiated with Manivest and put down earnest money in contempla-
tion of replacing the dilapidated equipment in order to retain 
the league bowlers, any realistic evaluation of the reasonable 
rental value could easily have been based upon the higher 
figure. The costs of a lessee's mismanagement should not be 
borne by the landlord. In fairness, the rental value ought 
to be based upon the highest and best use of the property. 
The Trial Court also considered the testimony of the 
Bowens' appraiser, Mr. Zakis, who concluded that based solely 
upon a cost approach the premises would only support a monthly 
rental of $1,800.00. (Tr. 297) The essential problem with 
this cost approach is that it only reflects what the Bowens 
were able to produce and not what the property is objectively 
worth. We respectfully submit that the testimony of John C. 
Brown with respect to the fair market value is entitled to 
greater weight for a variety of reasons. His qualifications 
and experience as an independent fee appraiser are substantially 
better than those of Appellants' witness. (Tr. 259-261 and 
Tr. 296-297) Mr. Brown has also had recent experience in 
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evaluating bowling alleys. (Tr. 264) His analysis included 
several different approaches, including the "income" approach 
and the "economic return" approach. (Tr. 266-267) By con-
trast, Mr. Zakis' analysis was limited to the "cost" approach. 
(Tr. 298) This approach considers only the value of the under-
lying property, the cost of reproducing the facilities and the 
element of depreciation. It does not consider in any way the 
amount of income that the property is likely to generate or a 
comparison with the income generated by other, similar 
properties. 
In a chapter dealing with the "Appraisal of Bowling 
Centers" by Thomas R. Coates in the Encyclopedia of Real Esta~ 
Appraising, (ed. by Edith J. Friedman, Prentice-Hall, 1968) 
there appears the following comment about the "income" approad 
used by Valley Lanes' expert: 
The appraiser must depend almost entirely on 
the Income Approach in estimating the value 
of a modern bowling center to the operator 
because of two special characteristics: 
1. The value of used bowling equipment is 
completely dependent on the income it 
will produce in the building in which 
it is located, since there is very 
little market at present for such equip-
ment. 
2. The modern bowling building is of 
special design and does not lend it-
self readily to conversion for other 
uses. 
The refurbished rental value of $5, 700.00 which Mr. Bro·." 
testified the property could produce is also based upon an 
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income per number of games bowled approach. And, this rental 
figure is predicated upon a very conservative estimate of the 
business potential when compared to other bowling businesses 
similarly situated. (Tr. 267-268) 
There was ample evidentiary support for the Trial Court's 
decision that $3,500.00 per month represented a realistic 
rental for the period of the hold-over. The judgment for 
Respondents which was based thereon should not be diminished 
on appeal. 
POINT III 
VALLEY LANES AS THE ASSIGNEE OF THE LANDLORD 
IS A CREDITOR BENEFICIARY OF THE PURCHASE 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN BROWN AND NELSON AND BOWENS, 
INC. , AND CHARLES AND SHIRLEY BOWEN PERSONl\LLY 
GUARANTEED TO PERFORM ALL OBLIGATIONS OF THE 
LEASE AGREEMENT AND THEREBY EXPRESSLY INTENDED 
TO BENEFIT THE LESSOR. 
The Appellants contend that the Trial Court's judgment 
against Charles and Shirley Bowen, as individuals, is without 
basis and should not be upheld. However, the relationship 
between the parties and the documents in evidence clearly 
support the Court's finding that the Bowens "personally guaran-
teed all of the terms and conditions of the purchase agreement, 
including the obligations of the tenants under the August 31, 
1966 Lease Agreement." (R.73) The following diagram will aid 
the Court in visualizing the relationship between the parties: 
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LAIWLORD (Lessor) TEN.l\NT (Lessee) 
Diamond Developments, Inc. 
(2) Assignment ----------~Nelson & Brown 
. l Manivest, Inc. 
(4) Assignment 
1 Respondents (Valley Lanes) 
(1) August 31, 
1966 Lease 
Agreement 




Respondents are the successors in interest to Manivest 
and Manivest was the owner and lessor of the property when 
Nelson and Brown entered into the 1973 Purchase Agreement 
(Ex. 1-P) with the Bowens. Respondents submit that they are 
creditor beneficiaries of that agreement by reason of the assic1 
I 
ment from Manivest since the agreement was specifically inten~ 
to benefit Manivest as a lessor. 
Paragraph 9 of the Purchase Agreement (Ex. 1-P) is 
entitled "Existing Lease" and it provides: 
Buyer acknowledges and understands that the 
land, building and fixed equipment presently 
used by Kearns Bowling Lanes is owned by 
MANIVEST, INC. and the right to use the same 
is subject to that certain Lease Agreement 
dated the 31st day of August, 1966, by and 
between DIAMONDS DEVELOPMENT, IUC., a Utah 
corporation, and ERNEST C. PASARRIS and 
W. HOWARD MAYES, as Lessors, and HOWARD C. 
NELSON and W. ROY BROWN of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, as Lessees, which Lease Agree-
ment is attached hereto and marked Exhibit "E". 
Buyer agrees to faithfully perform all terms, 
covenants and conditions of said Lease and 
any amendments, modifications and addendums 
to said Lease. In this connection Buyer 
agrees to provide Sellers at a place desig-
nated in writing by Sellers with a cashier's 
-18-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
check for the payments required to be made 
under the said Lease Agreement to the above 
said Lessors, or their assigns, not later 
than the first day of each and every month 
during the term of the said Lease commencing 
with the first day of September, 1973. It 
being the understanding that Sellers will 
then transmit the said lease payments to the 
Lessors. (emphasis added) 
Under Utah law, this Purchase Agreement is an effective 
assignment and not a mere sublease because a "sublease for the 
whole term is in law an assignment ." even though "rent 
and a right of re-entry for nonpayment are reserved, or even 
though it is called a sublease." Jensen v. O.K. Investment 
Corporation, 507 P.2d 713, (Utah, 1973). As a consequence, 
the subsequent assignment (Ex. 2-P) was merely redundant and 
as of the date of the Purchase Agreement, Manivest and Bowens, 
Inc. were in the relationship of landlord and tenant. As the 
Court put it in Jensen: 
Where the instrument creates an assignment 
and not a sublease the relationship of land-
lord and tenant exists between the lessor 
and the assignee and their rights, inter se 
are determined accordingly. 
Id. at 716. There can be no question that one of a landlord's 
rights is to enforce covenants contained in the lease because 
he is both in privity of contract and privity of estate with 
the tenant. Therefore, the lessor is clearly in a position 
to enforce the Purchase Agreement between Nelson and Brown 
and the Bowens because the Bowens agreed to "faithfully perform 
all terms, covenants and conditions of said Lease and any 
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amendments, modifications and addendums to said Lease." (Ex. 
1-P Paragraph 9) 
Additionally, there can be no question that Manivest anc 
Valley Lanes as their succesor are creditor beneficiaries of 
the Purchase Agreement. Section 133 of the Restatement of Cor.-, 
tracts provides: 
Where performance of a promise in a contract 
will benefit a person other than the promisee, 
that person is . a creditor beneficiary if 
no purpose to oake a gift appears from the 
terms of the promise in view of the accompany-
ing circumstances and performance of the 
promise will satisfy an actual or supposed or 
asserted duty of the promisee to the beneficiary. 
It is clear that under the Purchase Agreement the Bowens promiJ 
to perform their obligations as Lessees and successors in inter~ 
to the original Lease Agreement. And rent is a clear obligatkj 
under the lease. (Ex. 32-D page 1) The performance of their 
promise to pay rent is clearly a satisfaction of an "actual 
duty" which will benefit the lessor. 
In adopting this section of the Restatement of Contracts 
this Court has stated that if: 
The promissee's expressed intent is that some 
third party shall receive the performance in 
satisfaction and discharge of some actual or 
supposed duty or liability of the promisee 
the third party is a creditor beneficiary. 
(emphasis added) 
Schwinghammer v. Alexander, 21 Utah 2d 418, 446 P.2d 414 (1968' 
See also, Kelly v. Richards, 95 Utah 560, 83 P.2d 731 (1938). 
Appellants have cited various cases from other jurisdictions 
to the effect that the contract must evidence an intent to 
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benefit a third party before the third party will be in a 
position to enforce it. This is a correct statement of the 
law. In this case, however, there is abundant evidence of 
such an intent. 
The Purchase Agreement specifically names Manivest and 
further provides that the buyer agrees to faithfully perform 
all terms of the Lease Agreement. A more specifically expressed 
intent is hard to imagine. And there can be no question that 
this intent extends to Valley Lanes because the Lease Agree-
ment provides in Paragraph XIV (Ex. 32-D page 7) that: 
The terms and conditions hereof shall inure 
to and be binding upon the heirs, assigns 
and personal representatives of the parties 
hereto. 
And the Purchase Agreement (Ex. 1-P) provides in Paragraph 21, 
which is entitled "Executors and Assigns", that: 
[i]t is understood that the stipulations 
aforesaid are to apply and bind the heirs, 
executors, administrators, successors and 
assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
Respondents submit that if both agreements by their terms run 
to assigns then there can be no question that there is an express 
intent on the face of the contracts to benefit future assignees 
of the lessor. The fact that Valley Lanes is not specifically 
named in the agreements or that the contract is not exclusively 
for its benefit as a third party should not prevent it from 
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enforcing a duty owing to it as Lessor. 2 
Turning finally to the Bowens' personal guarantee, it 
should be noted that Paragraph 7 of the Purchase Agreement re-
quires them to pay "all bills and expenses of operation." Anc 
in a similar context involving a guarantee the Colorado Supre~ 
Court has held that "monthly payment of . rent . was 
a liability present in its course of business " and that 
"covenants to pay rent 
. run with the land, and that an 
assignee of a lease who accepts it is liable on the covenants." 
Shaffer v. George, 64 Colo. 47, 171 P. 881 (1918). This Court I 
has held in the context of a guarantee on a note that the 
guarantee follows the note and may be enforced by any one 
entitled to collect it. See First Nat'l Bank v. Taylor, 38 
Utah 516, 114 P. 529 (1911). In that same case the Court 
stated that: 
[i]t is not necessary, in order that the 
guarantee should be binding upon the guaran-
tor, that the debtor should have knowledge 
of the transaction, or be in any way a 
party thereto. The reason for the rule is 
that privity of contract between debtor and 
the guarantor is not required. 
2. See Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co. 10 Cal. 2d 
232, 73 P.2d 1163 (1937), in which the California Supre~' 
Court held that the lessor has a right of action as a 
creditor beneficiary against an assignee of a lease who 
agreed with the original lessee to assume the original 
lease even though the lessor was not a party to the con-
tract of assumption, and the contract was not exclusive!: 
for his benefit. The Court reasoned that such a result-
justified when "it is recognized that in contracts of th', 
creditor beneficiary type the main purpose of the prom 1 ~ 
is not to confer a benefit on the third party bencfic1J: 
but to secure the discharge of his debt or performance ' 
his duty to the third party." 
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Id. at 531. Similarly, in the context of a guarantee on a 
mortgage this Court has held that where the guarantee "was 
given to secure the performance of the terms and conditions 
of the contract assigned to the (plaintiff] [t]his was 
an absolute guarantee and upon the default of the third 
parties the [defendants] became liable to perform in their 
steads. Hallstrom v. Buhler, 14 Utah 2d 111, 378 P.2d 
355 (1963). This case is analogous in principle to the 
position of the Bowens. While the Purchase Agreement was 
signed by Bowens, Inc., Charles and Shirley Bowen, who are 
the principals of that family held corporation, also signed 
as personal guarantors to insure the performance of their 
corporation. The lessor would never have consented to the 
assignment to a corporation with insufficient assets to 
insure payment of the rent and thus the personal guarantee 
was required. There is no reason not to enforce that guaran-
tee in favor of the lessor as the parties clearly intended. 
To do otherwise would be to allow the Bowens to hide behind a 
family corporation and thereby avoid the personal obligations 
which they specifically assumed. 
CONCLUSION 
The appeal of the Bowens must fail. The District Court, 
upon receipt of all the evidence, found no basis to support 
Appellants' bald assertions of bad faith or inequitable deal-
ings. Rather, the evidence demonstrates that the Bowens are 
not entitled to an additional ten-year term both because the 
lease does not grant them such an option and because they 
totally failed to comply with the requirements of the lease 
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regarding renewal. Having held over after the expiration of 
the lease, the Bowens are required to pay a reasonable rental 
for the use and occupation of the premises. Based upon expert 
testimony, the Trial Court set a rental figure for the hold-
over period which is fair and equitable and strikes a balance 
between the disputed testimony placed in evidence. Finally, 
the performance of this obligation was personally guaranteed 
by the Bowens, as individuals. That guarantee was clearly 
intended to benefit the lessor and to insure the performance 
of the Bowens' obligations under the Lease Agreement. Conse-
quently, Respondents stand in the position of a bona fide thi~ 
party beneficiary to whom a duty is owing which this Court 
should uphold upon appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
/,~{ ( ·, / _; ,\,.......-, 
_ <cl..- c.-~~r-- L~ ·.1-''--~J'"Ll.c< _ 
PHILIP C. PUGSLEY J 
of and for 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief 
of Respondents were served upon John C. Green, 430 Judge 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, by hand delivery this 
28thday of July, 1978. 
-25-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
